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5.1 Introduction
The purpose of the chapter is twofold. One is to document the chronol-
ogy of rapid growth of household credit in Korea since the foreign ex-
change crisis in 1997. The other is to examine the development of the credit
card crisis in 2003 and evaluate the adequacy of ensuing policy responses.
Rapid increase in household debt was primarily the result of a large-
scale deregulation and paradigm shift mainly driven by various eﬀorts
taken to restructure the entire financial sector after the foreign exchange
crisis in 1997. The new principle adapted by financial institutions after the
financial deregulation was to put most emphasis on resource allocation
based on market mechanism. Price signal replaced direction government
intervention as the criterion in allocation of credit resources. It was a well-
known secret in the Korean financial market that household lending had
been more profitable than corporate lending. Consequently, removal of
government intervention coupled with a low interest rate resulted in ex-
pansion of the consumer credit market in an unprecedented pace. While
one cannot deny the fact that allocation of credit resources based on price
signal increased the eﬃciency of the economic system, recent economic
history oﬀers many examples of financial turmoil that were sparked by
rapid accumulation of debts soon after deregulation of the financial sector
without carefully revamping the regulatory framework. The deregulation
of the financial industry in Korea after the foreign exchange crisis was not
an exception in the sense that it was followed by a boom in the consumer
credit market that eventually resulted in a violent crash landing.
Chang-Gyun Park is an assistant professor in the College of Business Administration at
Chung-Ang University
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The most serious damage was done to the credit card market. Arrears
soared up and the overdue rate reached almost 30 percent. Several credit
card companies went bankrupt and were bailed out by the government or
parent banks. A sharp increase in the number of credit delinquents in large
part due to overdue credit card debts was accompanied by an increase in
unemployment and depression of consumption expenditure among the
delinquents. The havoc in the credit card market also caused social prob-
lems such as disintegration of family and suicides that invited serious con-
cerns from the general public as well as the policy circle. We discuss the de-
velopment of the credit card crisis with the presumption that it is a classic
example of regulatory failure. We argue that with timely and proper regu-
latory actions, much of the diﬃculty inflicted by the credit card crisis would
have been alleviated, if not averted.
The next section describes the development of the consumer credit mar-
ket in Korea after the foreign exchange crisis in 1997. Section 5.3 examines
the causes and consequences of fast increase in household debt. Section 5.4
focuses on the credit card crisis that occurred in 2003 and evaluates the ad-
equacy of policy measures that were taken in response to changes in mar-
ket condition. The conclusion follows.
5.2 Household Debt in Korea after the Economic Crisis
5.2.1 Increase in Household Debt
While showing a clear sign of stabilization recently, household debt in
Korea has grown at a spectacular pace since the foreign exchange crisis in
1997. According to figure 5.1, the household debt market seems to have
gone through three distinguished phases since 1997. The first phase covers
the period between 1997 and 1999 when household debt went through a
period of slump following the foreign exchange crisis and the subsequent
recession induced by the most part by the high interest rate policy that the
Korean government vigorously pursued to restore stability in the foreign
exchange market. Household debt dropped by 13 percent in 1998 and had
not recovered the precrisis level until 2000. Only after 2000, it gained mo-
mentum for rapid growth observed in the following three years that con-
stituted the second phase. Outstanding stock of household debt increased
by 120 percent from 2000 to 2002, while disposable income increased only
by 15.5 percent. As a consequence, debt burden soared, and households’
ability to repay considerably deteriorated. For example, the debt-to-
income ratio sharply increased to 113.3 percent in 2002, from just 63.8 per-
cent in 1999, and the debt-to-asset ratio also rose by 11.7 percentage points
from 40.1 in 1999 to 51.8 in 2002 (see figure 5.2).1
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1. Debt-to-income ratio is defined as the ratio between total household debt and disposable
income for households and private unincorporated enterprises. Debt-to-asset ratio is defined
Rapid accumulation of household debt invited serious concerns from
regulatory authority as well as credit providers. Alarmed with the unprece-
dented speed of debt accumulation, banks and credit card companies, two
major credit providers to households, started to reconsider their business
practices and tighten the conditions for credit provision.2 Regulatory au-
thority also took various policy measures to curb the explosive growth of
household debt. Consequently, the annual growth rate dropped to around
10 percent that is believed to be sustainable considering the long-term trend
of aggregate income growth. However, the economy paid dear for rapid ac-
cumulation of household debt. The biggest credit card company in Korea
was forced to resort to an emergency loan in order to avoid bankruptcy, and
the financial market underwent a couple of turbulent episodes in 2003 and
2004. The third phase started in 2003. Seemingly uncontrollable accumula-
tion of household debt came to a halt, and a cautious atmosphere replaced
the feverish race to extend lending toward the household sector. While the
speed of credit expansion was slowed down and the market regained a sense
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Fig. 5.1 Household debt in Korea: 1997–2005
Source: Bank of Korea.
Note: Growth rate is the annualized quarterly growth rate.
as the ratio between total individual debt and total individual assets in the Flow of Funds
table published by the Bank of Korea. The individual sector in the table includes private un-
incorporated enterprises and various nonprofit organizations as well as households. There-
fore, household debt in figure 5.1 does not coincide with individual debt in the Flow of Funds
table. The change of basis is unavoidable because information on aggregate asset holdings by
households is not available.
2. Most of the credit providers, especially credit card companies, tried to increase market
share in the belief that larger market share would bring them a competitive edge based on net-
work eﬀect.
of stability, financial companies in the consumer credit market were forced
to undergo a turbulent restructuring process to cope with serious degrada-
tion in quality of the consumer loan portfolios they possess.
5.2.2 Household Debt by Lender Type
Banks
Banks and credit card companies played the crucial role in increasing
household debt. Banks were not the biggest lenders to the household sec-
tor until the second quarter of 1999 when the bank loans to the household
sector overtook loans provided by other deposit taking institutions such as
savings banks, credit unions, and mutual saving cooperatives (see figure
5.3). The increase in the bank’s share in the consumer credit market from
1997 to 1999 was mainly due to contraction of nonbank deposit taking in-
stitutions. They were hit especially hard by the economic crisis in 1997 and
subsequent restructuring of financial industry. Banks were also seriously
aﬀected by the economic crisis, but the outstanding stock of loans house-
holds borrowed from banks has steadily increased except for the second
half of 1998 when the economy was in deep recession triggered by the eco-
nomic crisis and high interest rate policy pursued by the Korean govern-
ment. The status of banks as the biggest lender to the household sector was
further solidified between 2000 and 2002, and 56.7 percent of total debt
owed by the household sector was financed by banks in 2003.
As shown in figure 5.4, the biggest share of bank loans to the household
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Fig. 5.2 Trend in ability-to-repay indicators
Source: Bank of Korea.
Notes: Debt-to-income ratio is the ratio between household debt and household disposable
income. Debt-to-asset ratio is the ratio between individual debt and asset in the Flow of
Funds table.
sector was taken up by loans to households secured by residential proper-
ties (LSRP).3 While the proportion of LSRP in total bank loans to the
household sector was 47.8 percent at the end of 2000, it had continuously
risen to reach 62.4 percent in five years. During the five-year span from
2001 to 2005, a 71 percent increase in household debt provided by banks
was attributable to an increase in LSRP. As discussed later, LSRP in Korea
has very unique contract structure, and many commentators pointed out
that the unique aspects of the loan contracts, especially short maturity and
amortization scheme, could have some serious implications on the stabil-
ity of the financial system.
Credit Card Companies
Another major contributor to the growth of consumer credit after the
economic crisis in 1997 was credit card companies. The financial law in Ko-
rea allows financial institutions other than banks to issue credit cards and
provide various supplementary services such as cash advances.4 Sensing a
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3. Except for the National Housing Fund, the long-term mortgage market had not existed
in Korea until the Korea Housing Finance Cooperation was established in 2004. Because the
target of the National Housing Fund was limited to low- and middle-income households,
most of the mortgage financing was intermediated through short-term bank loans collateral-
ized by residential properties (LSRP). In Korea, LSRP has several distinguished features
diﬀerent from the traditional long-term mortgage product in terms of maturity, repayment
method, loan decision criteria, and so on. It is called a bullet mortgage due to these special
aspects of the loan contract. We discuss the details later.
4. In Korea, credit card companies are treated as financial institutions and are regulated
by the financial regulator. The law regulating the industry is the “Credit-specialized financial
company law.”
Fig. 5.3 Household debt by lender type
Source: Bank of Korea.
Notes: Housing finance institutions include the Korea Housing Finance Corporation and the
National Housing Fund. Other deposit-taking institutions include savings banks, credit
unions, and mutual saving cooperatives.
lucrative profit opportunity in the consumer credit market, several big non-
financial companies aﬃliated with big industrial conglomerates entered
the credit card industry in the late 1980s, and banks also established credit
card companies as an independent business to bypass restrictive regula-
tions on the banking sector.5
Starting from 2000, credit card companies led the early stage in the ex-
pansion of consumer credit. Credit card debt increased by 270 percent,
from 13.6 trillion Korea Won at the end of 1999 to 50.6 trillion KRW in the
third quarter of 2002. Loans by credit card companies constituted only 8.4
percent of the total household debt at the end of 1999. However, the pro-
portion of credit card debt doubled in three years, and it peaked at 16.2
percent in the third quarter of 2002. The explosive growth of credit card
debt came to a sudden halt in the fourth quarter of 2002, mainly due to 
increasing concern of the sustainability of the credit card industry and var-
ious regulatory measures to restrain the expansion of credit card debt.
Contraction of credit card debt stock was so spectacular that outstanding
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5. Samsung Card and LG Card were two notable examples of big nonfinancial companies.
Kookmin bank, the largest commercial bank in Korea and the Korea Exchange Bank were
two examples of banks that established credit card companies. There were also banks that
maintained a credit card business as an inside business unit. Most of the banks internalizing
a credit card business participated in the market through a credit card association, BC Card.
Fig. 5.4 Bank loans to household
Source: Bank of Korea.
Notes: LSRP is the loan to households secured by residential properties. Note that end-of-
the-year balances are presented for 2000 and 2001 due to lack of data.
debt stock reached 17.6 trillion KRW in the third quarter of 2005 (see fig-
ure 5.5).6
Credit cards typically provide three types of financial services to card-
holders: full payment, installment, and cash advance services. Figure 5.6 il-
lustrates the trend in the volume of transactions intermediated by the three
categories of services. One noticeable feature we can point out from the fig-
ure is that the accumulation of credit card debt was primarily driven by
cash advance services.7 It is widely accepted conventional wisdom in the
credit card industry that the cash advance service is more vulnerable to
credit risk than other forms of services. Loans initiated through cash ad-
vance should bring to borrowers high enough marginal utility that can jus-
tify a very high interest rate and consequently have much larger exposure
to credit risks than other forms of services. During the period between
2000 and 2002, the transactions initiated by the cash advance service oc-
cupied more than half of total transactions intermediated by credit cards.
That was an unmistakable foreboding of troublesome events to follow in
two or three years.
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6. That is, the size of outstanding credit card debt reduced by a third in three years.
7. We treat card loan as a form of cash advance service.
Fig. 5.5 Trend in credit card debt
Source: Financial Supervisory Service.
Notes: The bar chart indicates quarter-to-quarter change in outstanding balance and should
be read by the scale on the right-hand side. Scale is in trillion Korean Won. The line graph in-
dicates the outstanding balance at the end of each quarter and should be read by the scale on
the left-hand side. Scale is in percentage.
5.2.3 Distribution of Household Debt: Analysis of Microdata
In this section, we briefly present a set of micro-level analyses in order to
investigate the distributional aspects of increase in household debt. The
Korea Labor Institute (KLI) has maintained a panel of representative
households dating back to 1998. The annual survey, the Korea Labor and
Income Panel Study (KLIPS), mainly focuses on labor-related issues, but
it also provides information on various financial transactions. Among
seven waves of surveys that are currently available for public use, we drop
the first wave for compatibility reasons and employ data from 1998 to 2002
for the analyses. The time span covered by our data set coincides with the
first and the second phases in the development of the consumer credit mar-
ket after the economic crisis.
Table 5.1 reports the distribution of average debt holdings classified by
the age of household head. The overall pattern generally conforms to the
trend we observe in aggregate-level data. After a sluggish swing in 1998 and
1999, household debt started to increase at a considerable speed from 2000.
Average debt holding per household increased by 40 percent from 17.3 mil-
lion KRW in 1999 to 24.2 million in 2002. Even though household debt in-
creased in all age groups, households with heads aged in their fifties experi-
enced the fastest accumulation of debt. The average debt for the age group
doubled between 1999 and 2002. Households whose heads were aged below
thirty also experienced a significant jump in debt holdings. Their average
debt increased by 75 percent during the same period.
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Fig. 5.6 Credit card transaction volumes by service type
Source: Credit Finance Association of Korea.
Table 5.2 reports the average debt holdings by income percentiles. We
can point out that low- and middle-income households experienced rela-
tively faster growth of outstanding debt stock compared to the high-
income group. Households belonging to the 21 percent to 40 percent in-
come group saw their average debt balloon by 41 percent, from 11.8 million
KRW in 1998 to 16.7 million KRW in 2002. Households belonging to the
41 percent to 60 percent income group also experienced significant in-
crease in average debt holdings. However, it is interesting to note that debt
holdings by the highest income group did not go through considerable fluc-
tuations, and their average debt actually decreased diﬀerently from other
income groups.
We can interpret the results in table 5.2 from two diﬀerent perspectives.
First of all, we can argue that the results provide indirect evidence for alle-
viation of credit constraints in the consumer credit market. The fact that
lower-income households experienced faster debt accumulation may imply
the alleviation of severe liquidity constraint placed on them under the prac-
tices prevailing in the financial market before the economic crisis. Before
the economic crisis, direction intervention of the government in credit al-
location was a common practice. The Korean government pursued the de-
velopment policy to channel a disproportionately large amount of credit
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Table 5.1 Average household debt by age: 1998–2002 (thousand KRW)
Age group
Year 29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60 Total
1998 5,540 15,198 24,718 18,836 11,598 17,301
1999 3,963 13,690 22,892 19,965 12,000 16,592
2000 4,442 13,833 25,385 20,962 11,151 17,406
2001 8,896 16,576 26,585 29,480 13,659 20,669
2002 9,217 18,533 31,811 37,759 13,972 24,226
Notes: Age group is classified by age of household head. The surveys were conducted from
1999 to 2003.
Table 5.2 Average household debt by income groups: 1998–2002 (thousand KRW)
Income percentile 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
81–100 44,210 39,730 33,724 35,200 41,316
61–80 22,131 18,711 18,105 19,943 23,369
41–60 12,934 13,057 15,544 14,831 17,035
21–40 11,789 12,260 13,148 20,425 16,647
20 8,808 7,853 9,686 6,793 9,760
Total 17,301 16,592 17,406 20,669 24,226
Note: The surveys were conducted from 1999 to 2003.
resources into a small group of targeted industries to promote faster
growth. It was not rare that households were not able to borrow even
though they did possess enough assets to oﬀer as collateral in some cases,
let alone borrowing without collateral. After the economic crisis in 1997,
the Korean government gave up the traditional interventionist approach
and let the market determine resource allocation in the credit market. It
was then possible for financial institutions to increase the credit supply to
the household sector with less concern about nonentrepreneurial factors.
While the increase of credit provision to the household sector can be
used as evidence for lessening credit constraints, some critics pay particu-
lar attention to the fact that low-income households were provided credit
in such a scale in such a short span of time. They argue that considering the
speed and distributional feature of consumer credit expansion, it is quite
diﬃcult to justify without assuming some form of negligence from credit
providers. Until recently, banks in Korea had relied on old-fashioned judg-
mental methods in credit evaluation and had not been equipped with for-
mal credit risk management methods such as a credit scoring system.
Moreover, credit card companies used to issue credit cards to consumers
without proper checks on the ability to repay. They argue that the expan-
sion of consumer credit after the economic crisis was at least partly attrib-
utable to an inadequate risk management system, and the seeds for turmoil
in the Korean financial market in 2003 and 2004 had already started to ger-
minate.
We can also find evidence for the mounting debt burden on households
in microdata. Figure 5.7 summarizes change in average debt service ratio
(DSR) from 1998 to 2004.8 The DSR reported in figure 5.7 was calculated
based on the Survey of Household Income and Expenditure (SHIE), an
annual survey by the Korea National Statistical Oﬃce. The SHIE provides
vast amounts of detailed information on household expenditure and in-
come that the KLIPS does not report. The proportion of income dedicated
to pay interest and principals, if not rolled over, had been consistently in-
creased from 13.04 percent in 1998 to 22.97 percent in 2004. Even under a
persistently low interest rate and generous rollover policy, repayment bur-
den measured in DSR almost doubled in just six years. Low-income fami-
lies were aﬀected more by increased debt burden than high-income fami-
lies, which is in line with the result in table 5.2, where low-income families
were the main beneficiaries of extended credit opportunities.
In order to investigate the distributional aspects of debt accumulation
by households in a more formal manner, we estimate the following empir-
ical model with KLIPS panel data;
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8. Debt service ratio is defined as the ratio between the amounts used to pay interest and
principal, if any, to income.
y∗iy1[ y∗it0]  xit  i  εit,
where y∗it is the diﬀerence between supply of debt and desired level by
household i, xit is a vector of explanatory variables, i is the individual fixed
eﬀect, and εit is error term.
9 Econometricians are able to observe the
amount of debt held by a household only if the desired level is lower than
the level to which lenders are willing to provide credit. We have a fixed
eﬀect panel specification with a censored dependent variable and estimate
the model using a trimmed least squares (TLS) estimator proposed by
Honoré (1992) after imposing the usual independently and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) normality assumption on the error term.10 The explanatory
variables included in the regression are all frequently cited variables in the
literature.11 Income, amount of asset holding, family size, dummies for
household head’s age, educational attainment, homeownership, and a
dummy for type of employment are included. The estimation result is re-
ported in table 5.3.
The estimation result conforms to previous research done in other 
countries.12 Income, asset holding, family size, education attainment, and
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9. For a theoretical background of the empirical model, see Crook (2001).
10. Precisely speaking, the estimator is ˆ4 in the original paper, and it is obtained by opti-
mizing the loss function defined as Tn(b).
11. See Bertola, Disney, and Grant (2006).
12. See Crook (2006).
Fig. 5.7 Debt service ratio
Notes: High (low) income indicates the average DSR of households belonging to upper
(lower) 50 percent of income distribution. All figures are in percentiles.
homeownership are all significantly and positively related to debt holding.
On the other hand, wage earners and the unemployed are likely to hold
smaller debt stocks. Other sociodemographic variables such as marriage
and sex do not seem to be important factors in the determination of house-
hold demand for debt. Income elasticity of debt demand is consistently es-
timated to be around 0.2, which is much larger than (net) asset elasticity of
debt demand. Unlike the findings for other countries in Crook (2006) that
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Table 5.3 Determinants of debt holdings
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Income 0.2106∗∗∗ 0.2134∗∗∗ 0.2167∗∗∗ –0.4299∗∗∗
(0.0219) (0.02194) (0.0218) (0.1140)
Income squared 0.0471∗∗∗
(0.0081)
Net asset 0.0793∗∗∗ 0.0776∗∗∗ 0.0453∗∗∗ 0.0471∗∗∗
(0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0100) (0.0100)
Family size 0.0933∗∗∗ 0.0892∗∗∗ 0.0841∗∗∗ 0.0785∗∗∗
(0.0189) (0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0186)
Marriage (married  1) 0.0071 0.0082 0.0151 0.0183
(0.1235) (0.1229) (0.1218) (0.1212)
Education 1 (high school  1) 0.2196∗∗∗ 0.2176∗∗∗ 0.2269∗∗∗ 0.2111∗∗∗
(0.0668) (0.0663) (0.0658) (0.0655)
Education 2 (college  1) 0.2522∗∗∗ 0.2841∗∗∗ 0.2959∗∗∗ 0.2639∗∗∗
(0.0534) (0.0533) (0.0529) (0.0529)
Age 1 (35  age 	 45) 0.2015∗∗∗ 0.1698∗∗∗ 0.1396∗∗ 0.1320∗∗∗
(0.0663) (0.0626) (0.0678) (0.0667)
Age 2 (45  age 	 55) 0.4247 0.3694 0.2982 0.2818
(1.4157) (1.3682) (0.9320) (1.0437)
Age 3 (55  age 	 65) 0.5305∗ 0.4698∗ 0.3870 0.3699
(0.3031) (0.2847) (0.2513) (0.2531)
Age 4 (65  age) 0.2111∗∗∗ 0.1416∗∗∗ 0.0417∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0198) (0.0578) (0.0151) (0.0001)
Type of employment (self employed  1) 0.3224∗∗∗ 0.3383∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(0.0455) (0.0452) (0.0450)
Unemployed (unemployed  1) –0.1139∗∗ –0.1053∗ –0.1021∗∗
(0.0558) (.00553) (0.0552)
Homeownership (homeowner  1) 0.3571∗∗∗ 0.3554∗∗∗
(0.0335) (0.0436)
No. of observations 6,114 6,114 6,114 6,114
Wald 615.07∗∗∗ 672.49∗∗∗ 793.27∗∗∗ 833.27∗∗∗
(10) (12) (13) (14)
Notes: The dependent variable is in log and income; net asset are also in log. Quadratic loss function is
minimized for fixed eﬀect Tobit model as suggested by Honoré (1992). Standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. The Wald statistic is the test statistic for the joint significance of all explanatory variables except for
the intercept. Degrees of freedom are in parentheses under the test statistics.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
reports a concave function of income, demand for debt holding is a convex
function of income in the data range.
The pattern of debt accumulation along the life cycle closely follows that
of income, increasing in the thirties and forties and reaching the maximum
at midfifties then decreasing afterward. The pattern is quite diﬀerent from
those typically found in other countries.
In most of the countries reported in Crook (2006), demand for debt de-
creases as the age of household head increases. However, in the Korean
case, households accumulate more debts as age increases until reaching re-
tirement age. Such a pattern may reflect the characteristic feature of the
housing finance market in Korea. In the absence of a well-functioning
long-term mortgage market, a typical family in Korea has to accumulate
financial assets until savings can cover the down payment required to pur-
chase a home, which is, in most cases, at least 40 percent of the housing
price. The remaining amount should be borrowed from financial institu-
tions, mainly banks, by oﬀering the house for collateral. Therefore, the av-
erage age of a first-time home buyer in Korea is higher than that in other
countries where a long-term mortgage market is well established. Because
most home purchases are related to debt increase to some degree, as shown
in a significantly positive correlation between debt and homeownership in
table 5.3, the pattern of debt accumulation is likely to be closely correlated
with that of home purchase and mortgage debt repayment. People start to
buy homes in their late thirties, and the number of first-time home buyers
peaks at the midforties. Moreover, because most mortgage debts are not
amortized under the convention that debts are rolled over when maturities
arrive, we do not observe a statistically significant drop in debt holdings
even after home purchases.
5.3 Causes and Consequences
5.3.1 Causes
Changes in the Financial Market Environment
One of most obvious reasons why household debt increased at such a re-
markable speed in Korea seemed to be the low interest rate environment
that started in 1999 as the Korean government gave up the high interest
policy.
The policy especially advocated by the International Monetary Fund
was taken to restore stability in the foreign exchange market. Confronted
with a severe recession in 1998 due to a high interest rate and positive signs
in the foreign exchange market stability, the Korean government lowered
the interest rate to stimulate the slumping economy. In line with the favor-
able condition in the global financial market, the low interest rate policy
has been retained thereafter as shown in figure 5.8. Because a low interest
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rate, ceteris paribus, implies lower cost for debt financing and stronger de-
mand for borrowing, the low interest rate must have significantly con-
tributed to rapid increase in household debt.
Another fundamental change in the financial market was the change in
the financing pattern of the corporate sector. Before the economic crisis,
the Korean government chose the strategy to pursue economic develop-
ment by utilizing large conglomerates, chaebols, as the main engine. The
government mobilized massive amounts of credit resources required for
large-scale investment through the banking sector. Bank loans rather than
bonds or equities had been the main financial vehicles through which the
corporate sector raised funds for investment. However, the structural
fragility of the debt-driven development strategy was clearly revealed when
the economy was hit hard by sudden and massive capital outflow as the sol-
vency of chaebols became suspicious. Many conglomerates were forced to
declare bankruptcy or resort to a restructuring procedure. Several com-
mercial banks suﬀered severe losses from large nonperforming loans con-
centrated on failing conglomerates and were taken over by the Korea De-
posit Insurance Corporation or other less-aﬀected banks to prevent a
collapse of the financial system. Out of thirty-three commercial banks op-
erating at the end of 1997, ten banks disappeared. Five were liquidated,
and the other five were acquired by other surviving banks. Once the finan-
cial system regained stability, the Korean government accepted the reality
that pursuing economic development by channeling bank credits to se-
lected sectors was no longer viable and required the corporate sector to
strengthen the financial structure by reducing debt and injecting more cap-
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Fig. 5.8 Interest rates: 1997–2005
Source: Bank of Korea.
ital. As a result, the focus of funding for corporate investment shifted from
the banking sector to the capital market.
Table 5.4 illustrates the inflow of funds to the corporate sector from
banks and the capital market. We can confirm the fact that the capital mar-
ket replaced the banking sector as the main funding source for the corpo-
rate sector after the economic crisis. Shrinking demand for bank loans
from the corporate sector naturally put pressure on banks to pursue a more
aggressive approach in promoting loans to the household sector.
The structural transformation of banks’ loan portfolios is clearly illus-
trated in figure 5.9. The proportion of household loans in banks’ total loan
portfolios had stayed well below 30 percent until 1998 but increased con-
tinuously to reach 48.9 percent in 2004. In 2005, hitting the historical high
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Table 5.4 Source of corporate finance (billion KRW)
Year Bank loan Bond and equity Total
1996 44,977 35,191 80,167
1997 37,728 37,731 75,459
1998 –63,634 70,253 6,619
1999 –3,759 71,785 68,026
2000 19,658 73,011 92,669
2001 –27,487 99,363 71,875
2002 34,002 87,421 121,423
2003 28,129 72,909 101,038
Source: Bank of Korea.
Fig. 5.9 Composition of banks’ loan portfolios
Source: Bank of Korea.
Note: From bottom to top, household loans, corporate loans, and others.
at 49.8 percent, loans to the household sector finally surpassed those to the
corporate sector.
Deregulation of the Financial Sector
Though deregulation of the financial sector had already begun in the
1990s, it was not until the onset of the economic crisis in 1997 that the lib-
eralization and deregulation of the financial market was vigorously pur-
sued. Amid various policies and actions taken during the deregulation pro-
cess, the most important change was the paradigm shift in the way financial
institutions are managed. Under the old regime, banks were simply re-
garded as instrumental agents to mobilize savings and channel them to
strategically selected industries. Profitability of individual banks was not a
primary concern as long as banks served the policy goals set by the gov-
ernment. Even banks themselves did not regard themselves as private busi-
nesses but as semipublic entities with an important mission to serve the
public interest by contributing to economic development. Under the new
regime, the government gave up the traditional approach to the financial
sector as well as to economic development. Enhancement of the eﬃciency
in the allocation of credit resources became the primary policy goal of fi-
nancial regulation, and price mechanism replaced the government as the
main player in credit resource allocation.
Aside from the fundamental paradigm shift in financial regulation, nu-
merous measures were taken to embody the philosophical transformation
at the operational level. The entry barrier to the financial industry was low-
ered significantly, and foreigners were allowed enter the industry by estab-
lishing a local subsidiary or acquiring the existing domestic companies.
The Financial Holding Company Act was enacted to promote competition
among diﬀerent sectors in the financial industry. Implicit regulation on the
interest rate and service fees on financial services were also abolished, and
financial institutions were given discretion to choose the level of prices for
the services they provide. Financial companies were allowed to be involved
in numerous activities that had required authorization or consent from the
regulator by simply reporting to the regulator.
As a result of fundamental changes brought by deregulation eﬀorts,
profitability was firmly established as the primary goal of all sorts of fi-
nancial companies. Banks converted their attention to loans to the house-
hold sector from corporate loans they had consistently focused on. Except
for intervention by the government, implicit or explicit, it is quite diﬃcult
to find justification for the large share of corporate loans before the eco-
nomic crisis as shown in figure 5.9, considering the fact that loans to the
household sector had consistently been, on average, more lucrative and
less risky than loans to the corporate sector, at least until 2003 according
to table 5.5. It was then natural in some sense to observe a sudden shift of
business practice in the banking industry and fast growth of loans to the
household sector.
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5.3.2 Consequences
Eﬃciency Improvement and Welfare Gain
Because wider penetration of financial intermediation oﬀers more op-
portunities for mutually beneficial voluntary exchanges, it, in general, re-
sults in more eﬃcient resource allocation and higher welfare. Even if it is
diﬃcult to draw a firm conclusion due to a lack of hard evidence, we can
oﬀer some circumstantial evidence for the claim that the increase in house-
hold debt may have brought several positive eﬀects. Based on the discus-
sion in the previous section, one can argue that increased inflow of credit
resources into the household sector itself reflects eﬃciency improvement in
the allocation of credit resources. Free from government intervention,
lending financial institutions were able to take the full advantage of bene-
fits from loans to the household sector, the higher interest rate, and the
lower default rate. Borrowers also benefited from a more-generous provi-
sion of credit resources. As more and more consumers free themselves
from credit and liquidity constraints, it became easier for them to achieve
intertemporal reallocation of consumption in pursuing a smoother life-
time consumption path. According to an extensive study by Kim (1995),
the household sector had been under very severe credit and liquidity con-
straints before the economic crisis, and it was virtually impossible to bor-
row from banks without providing collateral.13 At least to some degree, one
cannot deny the fact that the large inflow of credit into the household sec-
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13. Here is paradoxical evidence for the claim that consumer loans were severely discour-
aged. Two special purpose banks specializing in consumer credit were established by the gov-
ernment. Kookmin Bank, now privatized and the biggest commercial bank in Korea, was es-
tablished to deal with the consumer and small oﬃce/home oﬃce (SOHO) loans. Another
bank specializing in consumer finance was the Korea Housing Bank, merged with Kookmin
Bank in 2001, whose business area was in mortgage finance.
Table 5.5 Average loan rate and default rate
Loan rate Default rate
Year Household Corporate Household Credit card Corporate
1997 12.30 11.75 3.3 3.3 7.3
1998 15.21 15.20 7.1 17.9 8.9
1999 10.85 8.91 3.2 6.8 4.4
2000 9.88 8.18 2.4 7.7 3.4
2001 8.20 7.49 1.3 7.5 2.1
2002 6.92 6.50 1.5 11.9 2.0
2003 6.50 6.17 1.8 10.9 2.1
2004 5.88 5.92 1.8 5.5 2.1
2005 5.64 5.75 1.4 3.9 1.9
Notes: All interest rates are average rates charged for new loans in each category. Default rate
of credit card loan is for all credit card debt granted by banks.
tor contributed to alleviating restrictions imposed on intertemporal bud-
get constraints and helped consumers achieve better resource allocation.
According to figure 5.10, while income distribution in Korea shows the
tendency to worse as indicated by the rising Gini coeﬃcient for income dis-
tribution after the economic crisis, inequality in consumption seems to be
reduced. As long as the improvement in consumption equality was not to-
tally financed by reckless loan provision by lenders who did not recognize
the importance of credit evaluation in making a loan decision, this could
imply that fewer consumers are aﬀected by imperfection in the financial
market and are able to attain a better position in allocating consumption
in an intertemporal context.14
Potential Deterioration of Stability in the Financial System
In the previous section, we show that one of the main driving forces be-
hind the explosive growth of household debt between 2000 and 2002 was
the increase in LSRP supplied by banks.15 In the five years from 1999 to
2003, LSRP quadrupled, and total loans to households by banks tripled so
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14. One cannot deny that some part of the consumption was financed by debt that was
recklessly extended without scrutinizing the credibility of borrowers.
15. The term LSRP is used in the Basel II accord to represent any form of loan contract
collateralized by residential properties. That includes various kinds of loan contracts such as
equity loans and bullet mortgages as well as conventional long-term mortgages. We use the
term LSRP to indicate the bullet mortgage explained later in detail in order to distinguish it
from the conventional long-term mortgage.
Fig. 5.10 Trend in Gini coeﬃcient: Income and consumption
Source: Author’s calculation based on the National Household Income and Expenditure Sur-
vey (NHIES).
that the proportion of LSRPs in household loan portfolios rose from 58.1
percent in 2001 to 62.4 percent in 2005. The pace of LSRP growth in the
booming period between 2000 and 2002 was especially spectacular, with
an annual growth rate over 50 percent.
Compared to the conventional long-term mortgage contract, we can
point out three distinguishing characteristics in the LSRP contract preva-
lent in Korea: short maturity, no amortization of principals, and low loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio. First, LSRP has a very short maturity structure. A
typical LSRP matures in three years, and the maturity is shortened further
when conditions in the credit market deteriorate. According to a survey by
the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) in 2005, 47.6 percent of LSRP
have a (original) maturity no longer than three years, 21.4 percent for three
to five years. On the other hand, LSRP with maturity longer than ten years
occupies 25.3 percent of total LSRP, and the weight increased by 15.7 per-
centage points compared to the previous survey in 2003. The rapid increase
is mainly attributable to the establishment of the Korea Housing Finance
Corporation in 2003 in the wake of rapid increase in LSRP and subsequent
rising concerns on its long-term stability.16 According to table 5.6, all coun-
tries surveyed by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS; 2006) other
than Korea have long-term mortgages with maturity no shorter than ten
years as the primary instrument in the housing finance market.
The second feature of LSRP in Korea is that borrowers are not required
to repay the principal till maturity. Borrowers pay only interest on regular
basis, and the loan is rolled over unless serious events that may harm the
credibility of the borrower or collateral, such as delayed interest payment,
default, and sharp decrease in housing value, happen.17 In order to deal
with possible risk factors embodied in the second feature of LSRP in Ko-
rea mentioned in the preceding, LTV is set at very low level compared to a
long-term mortgage with amortization. The average LTV for LSRP in Ko-
rea is currently well below 60 percent. According to table 5.6, in most of the
countries with the conventional mortgage system, LTV is set at 70 percent
to 80 percent when the loan contract originates.
Literature calls the type of mortgage loan dominating the housing fi-
nance market in Korea a bullet mortgage to emphasize the risk factor em-
bodied in the loan contract (Fabozzi and Modigliani 1992). Because the
principal is carried to maturity without amortization, borrowers are re-
quired to pay a very large amount of money when maturity arrives. Bor-
rowers have three ways to deal with the arrival of maturity; refinance the
debt through rollover or borrow from other lenders, repay the debt by liq-
uidating other assets, or sell the collateralized property and settle the debt.
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16. The KHFC started to sell long-term mortgage loans from March 2004.
17. Monthly interest payment is the usual arrangement. In some cases, borrowers are
asked to pay a very small portion (typically less than 5 percent) of the principal as a precon-
dition for rollover of the matured loan.
If the first option is available, no significant disruption would occur. A new
debt contract will be signed, and the borrower is required to pay only in-
terest without amortization of the principal until maturity. The maturity
clock restarts. The second option is available for borrowers who have al-
ready accumulated enough assets to cover the amount of debt. Consider-
ing the high income-to-house price ratio in Korea, very few people qualify
to choose the second option, especially among young borrowers.18 Should
neither the first nor the second option be available, a borrower would be
forced to sell the collateralized house to meet the repayment obligation.
Under the usual circumstances, the sales receipt would be large enough to
cover the repayment as long as LTV was set and maintained at an accept-
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18. Average income-to-house price ratio for an urban residence is known to be around 10
in Korea. Assuming that average propensity to consume is 0.3 and average LTV is 60 percent,
an average worker should save at least ten years to accumulate enough assets to cover the prin-
cipal repayment. With the bullet mortgage with a maturity of three years, the mortgage con-
tract should be rolled over three or four times for an average borrower to exercise the second
option in the text. In other words, no major events that make lenders refuse rollover of ma-
tured debt should occur for a very long period of time.
Table 5.6 Features of mortgage contract in selected countries
Usual length Estimated average % of 
of contract loan-to-value owner-occupiers
Country (years) ratio (new loans) with mortgages
Australia 25 60–70% 45
Belgium 20 80–100% 56
Canada 25 75–95%a 54
France 15–20 78% 37.5
Germany 20–30 80–100%; 60% for Pfandbrief n.a.
Italy 5–20 80% n.a.
Korea 3–20 56.4%; max 70% n.a.
Japan 20–30 n.a.b n.a.
Luxembourg 20–25 80% n.a.
Mexico 10–15 80–100% n.a.
The Netherlands 30 87%; max 125% 85
Spain 15–20 70–80% n.a.
Sweden 30–45 80–95% n.a.
Switzerland 15–20 Max 80%; 65% for Pfandbrief issuance n.a.
United Kingdom 25 70% 60
United States 30 Typically about 85% 65.1c
Source: BIS (2006).
aSeventy-five percent for convential (noninsured) mortgage loans and 95 percent for insured
mortgage loans.
bn.a.  not available. The Government Housing Loan Corporation discloses the average
loan-to-value ratio for the underlying mortgages of its mortgage backed securities (MBSs).
The ratio has been approximately 70–80 percent from the first issue in March 2001 to date.
c2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
able level. The liquidation of collateral, voluntary or not, in most cases im-
plies that the borrower confronts a stressful situation. When the stressful
situation occurs at a personal level, borrowers would be able to execute the
strategy. However, when it comes to a stressful situation at an economy-
wide level, such as severe depression, they will have considerable diﬃcul-
ties. Under the circumstances, lenders would become very selective in
granting rollover and renewing the debt contract, and a significant chunk
of maturing debt would be denied renewal of contract, and most of the bor-
rowers who are rejected in the rollover application would have to resort to
liquidating the collateralized house. Enormous pressure applied to the
supply side of the housing market is highly likely to result in considerable
price shock or, in some cases, panic in the housing market. Disappearing
liquidity, plummeting prices, and a rush to dump assets at all costs are a few
examples of chaotic events we observe in a depressed-asset market. Kindle-
berger and Aliber (2005) documented numerous historic events when
abrupt change in investors’ moods or the market environment led to panic
in the financial market and crisis in the economic system. With the average
maturity of three years, roughly a third of total outstanding debt will ma-
ture within a year. Therefore, rapid accumulation of bullet mortgage debt
has already become one of the major risk factors that might harm the sta-
bility of the financial system. Moreover, banks did not regard a borrower’s
income as the main variable on which the loan decision was based. In other
words, as long as he or she could provide enough collateral to cover the
principal, a borrower did not have diﬃculty obtaining a mortgage loan,
even if both borrower and lender knew that the borrower did not have the
ability to accumulate enough savings to repay the debt when it matured.
The strategy was acceptable to both lenders and borrowers in Korea. Un-
der a bullet mortgage contract, neither party expects the borrower to ac-
cumulate enough savings to repay the debt by the time the loan matures in
two or three years. Instead, both parties expect that during the contract,
the house price will increase significantly and the borrower will be able to
repay the debt by using capital gain. Even if their expectation is not ma-
terialized, the borrower is easily granted a rollover of the maturing loan 
unless serious events occur that make it impossible to renew the loan con-
tract, such as a delayed interest payment or a violation of the LTV condi-
tion due to a drop in the price of property oﬀered as collateral. However, if
the serious events occur on an extraordinary scale, rollover for a significant
portion of matured debt will be denied, and most debtors will be forced to
respond to a call for repayment by liquidating the collateral. It is highly
likely that a downward spiral of the housing price will be initiated and fur-
ther deterioration of the mortgage market follows, which, if not properly
controlled, may lead to a disastrous collapse of the financial market and
the economic system.
In a theoretical exploration on structural characteristics of the bullet
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mortgage contract, Park and Hur (2006) argue that the bullet mortgage
contract is more robust to adverse income shock, but more vulnerable to
adverse housing price shock than the conventional mortgage contract. Be-
cause borrowers under the conventional mortgage arrangement are re-
quired to pay interest and part of the principal, they have to set aside a
larger portion of income to meet periodic repayment obligations than bor-
rowers under the bullet mortgage. Aﬀected by the same adverse shock to
income, borrowers with a conventional mortgage will be more prone to de-
fault than borrowers with a bullet mortgage. On the other hand, borrowers
with a conventional mortgage are less prone to adverse shock to the hous-
ing price than borrowers with a bullet mortgage because they are not sub-
ject to the LTV condition as long as they fulfill scheduled repayments. Un-
der a bullet mortgage contract, borrowers are required to meet the LTV
condition when the debt contracted is renewed after the maturity for the
old contract arrives. Aﬀected by a large adverse shock on the housing
price, borrowers will have much diﬃculty meeting the LTV condition when
they try to get a rollover granted by banks.
Fabozzi and Modigliani (1992) provided convincing historical evidence
on the fragility of the bullet mortgage system. After the economy was seri-
ously hit by the Great Depression, massive foreclosure of homes under the
bullet mortgage contracts occurred as a result of the collapse of housing
prices and failure to renew maturing mortgage contracts. The wealth eﬀect
made the recovery of private consumption very sluggish, and the economy
suﬀered greatly from the delayed recovery. Fabozzi and Modigliani (1992)
argue that the U.S. Congress enacted the National Housing Act of 1934
that oﬀered the legal foundation for the Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation (Fannie Mae) in order to circumvent the structural problem em-
bodied in the bullet mortgage system by encouraging the development of
the long-term mortgage market.
It seems that policymakers started to notice the risk factor involved in
rapid accumulation of bullet mortgage debt around 2002 and took various
policy measures to help smooth rollover of maturing debts and introduce
conventional mortgage instruments into the Korean housing finance mar-
ket. The Korean Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC) was established
in 2003 to promote a conventional mortgage market. The KHFC was as-
signed important instruments to accomplish the mission. First, unlike
Fannie Mae or Ginnie Mae in the United States, the KHFC sells conven-
tional long-term mortgage products to consumers thorough various finan-
cial institutions. Financial institutions are not legally involved in loan con-
tracts, and they are simply agents employed by the KHFC. Second, the
KHFC securitizes mortgage loans by issuing mortgage-backed securities.
It is too early to make a verdict on the eﬀectiveness of government poli-
cies to reduce the risk factor in the housing finance market by promoting
long-term mortgage products. However, it is very diﬃcult to claim those
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policies showed stellar performances. Due to lack of accurate oﬃcial sta-
tistics on the proportion of LSRP, we do not know how prevalent the bul-
let mortgage is in the Korean housing finance market. According to an FSS
survey in 2005, 70.5 percent of LSRP in May 2005 were bullet mortgage
loans, but the proportion declined very fast. The good news is that the pro-
portion of LSRP with amortization doubled in two and half years. It was
only 14.1 percent in 2003 but rose to 28.3 percent in May 2005.19
In spite of various policy eﬀorts, the banking sector in Korea is still ex-
posed to considerable risk factors stemming from structural fragility of
bullet mortgage debts. It should also be mentioned that slow but steady
progress toward a housing finance system with a more robust structure is
clearly observed.
Increase in Credit Delinquents
In Korea, credit delinquent is the term reserved to indicate people who
are in arrears for an amount larger than 0.3 million Korean Won for longer
than three months and recorded at the public registry maintained by the
Korea Federation of Banks.20 The information stored at the registry is shared
among the member financial institutions.
The explosive increase in household debt and the subsequent deteriora-
tion in households’ ability to repay resulted in a rapid increase in house-
hold arrears and credit delinquents.
According to figure 5.11, the number of credit delinquents increased sig-
nificantly in 1998 and declined slightly from 1999 to 2000. The number rose
again at a rapid pace from the latter half of 2002 and continued to rise un-
til the first quarter of 2004.
The large increase in credit delinquents in 1998 was attributable to severe
depression initiated by the foreign exchange crisis at the end of 1997. Re-
bounding of economic conditions from the last quarter of 1998 was re-
flected in the slight decline in credit delinquents from 1999. The second
wave of increase in registered credit delinquents started from the second
half of 2002 and was closely associated with the increase in household debt
between 2000 and 2002 and the sluggish economy in 2002. In the first quar-
ter of 2003, the number of credit delinquents increased by 11.2 percent
compared to the previous quarter. That was the biggest jump since the for-
eign exchange crisis.21 The number of credit delinquents finally exceeded 3
million and continued to reach 3.83 million in the first quarter of 2004. The
term credit delinquent was oﬃcially discarded in 2005, and the statistics on
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19. It is conventional wisdom in the market that the proportion of conventional long-term
mortgages has increased steadily since then.
20. The sum is equivalent to approximately US$300.
21. The number of credit delinquents increased by 20.4 percent in the second quarter of
2001. But the increase was due to the change in registration criteria in March 2001 and does
not represent change in economic condition.
credit delinquents have not been announced since then.22 However, it is
known that the decline that started in the second quarter of 2004 contin-
ued until the number dropped to approximately 3 million at the end of
2005. The decline was mainly due to active restructuring of nonperforming
household loans rather than improvement of ability to repay the debt such
as increased income or decreased debt burden.
Shin, Hahn, and Park (2003) pointed out four reasons for the rapid 
increase of credit delinquents after the second quarter of 2003; adverse
macroeconomic conditions, serious moral hazard committed by credit
card companies, ineﬃcient allocation of credit resources due to the lack of
an adequate scheme to share credit information, and improper and un-
timely financial regulation.
The slumping economy since the third quarter of 2000 generated adverse
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22. Public registration of credit delinquents was discarded, but collection and sharing of
credit information continued. The policy to register credit delinquents had been subject to se-
vere criticism that the classification was not only an arbitrary one void of sound economic jus-
tification but became an obstacle that prevented individual financial institutions from devel-
oping a credit scoring system.
Fig. 5.11 Trend in credit delinquents
Source: Korea Federation of Banks.
Notes: The KFB tightened the criteria of registration at the second quarter of 2001. The
change was reflected in a sudden jump of number of registered credit delinquents. On the
other hand, the KFB lowered the criteria of registration at the first quarter of 2002. Several
administrative errors were cleared in March 2004 to lead to a slight decline in the number of
credit delinquents. Many were already deceased or were registered more than twice.
shock on income as well as debt burden and ultimately made ability to re-
pay deteriorate. That would result in increase of arrears in household debt
and registered credit delinquents. Equation (1) based on Shin, Hahn, and
Park (2003) indicates that the number of credit delinquents is positively
correlated with household debt and negatively correlated with income. The
result conforms with the literature reporting the empirical findings that
households’ ability to repay debts is associated with income, debt burden,
and interest rate.23 Change in credit delinquents is regressed on lagged
change in household debt and income employing the quarterly data from
1998 to 2004. An increase in household debt would result in an increase in
credit delinquents a year later. Similarly, an increase in income measured
by Gross National Income (GNI) would lead to a decrease in credit delin-
quents a year later.
(1) 
 ln CDt  6.1354  0.3199
 ln HDt3  0.6005
 ln HDt4
(0.8153) (1.5634)
 0.3232
 ln GNIt1  0.4971
 ln GNIt2
(0.7764) (1.5039)
 0.2116
 ln GNIt3  0.4318
 ln GNIt4
(0.9082) (1.8634)
 8.3342 D01/2(2.3568)
R2  0.5034 number of observations  28
In equation (1), D01/2 indicates the dummy for change in registration cri-
teria occurred in the second quarter of 2001, and t-values are in parenthe-
ses under the estimates.
Explosive growth of credit card loans in 2000 and 2001 and the subse-
quent increase in the default rate is another important factor that sparked
an increase of credit delinquents. Deregulation of the credit card industry
in 1999 triggered a throat-cutting competition to expand market share
among credit card companies. The competition was a blind race to take the
top position in size. Many borrowers with very high credit risk who would
have been refused loans were allowed to access the credit market without
proper credit evaluation. Owned by banks or large conglomerates, credit
card companies underevaluated the possibility of their failure and charged
into the competition with no prudence. They believed that they were too
big to fail and the government would not be able to watch them get into
trouble. That was a reckless moral hazard committed by credit card com-
panies. Moreover, the majority of bonds issued by credit card companies
to finance credit card loans were possessed by banks and money market
funds that are generally regarded to be linked to system risk. That also fu-
eled the belief that the government would not allow credit card companies
to get into diﬃculty. Credit cards were issued recklessly without proper
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23. For an excellent survey on the topic, see CBO (2000).
checks on credit risk, and the limits on cash advance services were raised
frequently even if the borrower had already held a significant outstanding
balance to repay.
As we have already seen in figure 5.6, increase in credit card debt during
the boom in 2000 and 2001 was led by a cash advance service that embod-
ied much higher credit risk than other forms of services credit cards pro-
vide. Confronting mounting arrears and accumulation of distress assets,
the financial regulator took a decisive measure to stop the rapid expansion
of credit card debts and prevent further deterioration of the situation.24
The growing concern about the viability of credit card companies and
the sudden turning of policy stance resulted in a violent crash ending in the
fourth quarter of 2002. Already having huge diﬃculty in paying monthly
bills, a significant portion of credit card debtors had managed to escape
falling into arrears by financing a new debt from other credit card compa-
nies or the usurious private loan market. Sudden strengthening of regula-
tory measures and subsequent tightening of credit risk management by
credit card companies resulted in a massive increase in arrears. That could
explain a lot of the steep increase of credit delinquents in 2003.
In order to see the role played by credit card companies in growing credit
delinquents, we decompose the credit delinquents according to the finan-
cial institutions that reported them overdue, satisfying the registration cri-
teria. Figure 5.12 illustrates the change in credit delinquents registered by
a single type of financial institution. It is obvious that credit card compa-
nies played the most significant role in the increase of credit delinquents
both in the second quarter of 2001 and in the second half of 2002.
We can draw the same conclusion from figure 5.13 that reports the
changes in the number of credit delinquents registered by more than one
kind of financial institution. Among the increase in the registered by mul-
tiple categories of financial institutions, nearly 90 percent were involved
with credit cards in 2002 and 95 percent in 2003.
Lack of a well-functioning credit information system is pointed out as
another major contributing factor to the aggravation of the problem.
Roughly speaking, the credit information system consists of a credit re-
porting system that collects and distributes credit information among fi-
nancial institutions and a credit evaluation system of individual financial
institutions that evaluates the creditworthiness of individual borrowers,
such as a credit scoring system (CSS) and behavior scoring system (BSS).
The current form of credit reporting system was established in Korea in
1955 when the Bank Supervisory Oﬃce introduced a compulsory report-
ing system that obliged all participating financial institutions to report
delinquent credit information satisfying criteria set by agreement among
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24. We will discuss the development of the credit card crisis in 2003 in the next section.
Fig. 5.12 Change in credit delinquents by financial institutions (FIs): 
Single registration
Source: Korea Federation of Banks.
Note: Others include insurance companies, mutual savings banks, and mutual cooperatives.
Fig. 5.13 Change in credit delinquents by financial institutions (FIs): 
Multiple registrations
Source: Korea Federation of Banks.
Note: Others include insurance companies, mutual savings banks, and mutual cooperatives.
participating financial institutions.25 Under the Use and Protection of
Credit Information Act (UPCIA) enacted in 1995, the Korea Federation of
Banks was appointed as the agent of the Banking Supervisory Oﬃce to
maintain the public registry empowered by the law.26 The credit informa-
tion gathered by the public registry and shared among participating finan-
cial institutions consisted mainly of negative information such as loan
delinquency, default, and fraud. Positive information maintained by the
registry was limited to outstanding loan balance and number of credit
cards held. Moreover, it was not until 2001 that the limited range of posi-
tive information began to be collected by the registry. It is a well-known
proposition that the use of credit information limited to negative informa-
tion results in ineﬃcient allocation of credit resources by lowering the ac-
curacy of the credit evaluation system.27 Therefore, the lack of adequate
credit information must have, at least in part, contributed to ineﬃcient al-
location of credit resources and ultimately to an increase in credit delin-
quents. However, the practice to evaluate credit risk of individual borrow-
ers was a more important reason for the serious development of the
problem. According to Shin and Park (2006), it was not until 2003 that
banks seriously regarded the credit scoring system as an integral part of de-
cision making on consumer loans.28 Moreover, credit card companies also
did not have a workable credit scoring system until 2003 when the credit
card crisis hit the industry very hard. In sum, we can conclude that the star-
tling growth of household debt between 2000 and 2002 was not issued
based on sound practice of evaluating borrowers’ credit risk, and a huge
jump in credit delinquents in 2001 and 2003 was a somewhat predictable
event.
Last, we can point out the role of untimely and improper regulatory re-
sponses in the deterioration of conditions in the market. The mistakes
committed by the regulatory authority during the development of events
become more conspicuous when we examine the series of policy measures
taken in response to development in the credit card market since 2002. We
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25. The integrated body of financial regulators, the Financial Supervisory Commission
(FSC) and the Financial Supervisory Service, was established after the foreign exchange cri-
sis. Before the FSC was established in 1998, there were three main separate financial regula-
tors, the Bank Supervisory Oﬃce in the Bank of Korea, the Securities Supervisory Oﬃce, and
the Insurance Supervisory Oﬃce.
26. The Korea Federation of Banks had already performed as the de facto public registry
of credit information since early 1980s through the authorization of the Bank Supervisory
Oﬃce. However, the authorization was not based on the legal mandate but on the convenience
of the supervisor.
27. See Barron and Staten (2003) for a detailed discussion of the value of positive infor-
mation on the performance of the credit scoring system.
28. The first credit scoring system in the Korean banking sector was introduced by Hana
Bank in 1996. Other banks followed in introducing a credit scoring system in the late 1990s.
However, the traditional evaluation system utilizing a score card had been the primary tool
used in loan decisions. The credit scoring system was not regarded as the integral part of the
process and was used as a supplementary device.
will present a detailed discussion on the policy responses to credit card cri-
sis in the next section.
5.4 Credit Card Crisis: Policy Responses and Evaluation
5.4.1 Development of the Credit Card Crisis
Even though the credit card was first introduced to Korea in 1979, the
appearance of the credit card as a major financial instrument in the con-
sumer credit market should wait about twenty more years as we discussed
in previous sections.
In addition to the spectacular growth of credit card debt since 2000 we
discussed in the previous sections, one can quote the following statistics in
order to give more hints on how fast credit card usage penetrated the Ko-
rean economy since the foreign exchange crisis. The number of merchants
accepting credit cards was less than one million in 1992, and it increased
seventeen fold in just ten years to mark 17 million participating merchants
in 2003. On the other hand, the average number of credit cards an eco-
nomically active person in Korea possesses also increased very fast, from
one in 1993, to two in 1998, and to a peak of 4.6 in 2002. The use of the
credit card has become so common that about a half of total private con-
sumption expenditure has been intermediated by the credit card since
2002. The comparable figure was only 15.5 percent in 1999.
As an almost inevitable consequence of fast credit expansion, the aver-
age quality of a loan portfolio started to drop. The overdue loan rate was
already crawling up in the second half of 2001 when few raised questions
about possible risk factors behind the fast loan growth. The overdue loan
rate for debt by credit card companies increased very fast, reaching 10.9
percent at the end of 2002. It seemed that the steep increase in the overdue
rate was temporarily halted during the first half of 2003. However, the of-
ficial statistics on the overdue loan rate was quite misleading because
confronted with mounting overdue loans, credit card companies tried to
window-dress the quality of their loan portfolios by replacing overdue
loans with additional credit to debtors in serious arrears. Oﬃcial statistics
did not include the overdue loans once they were replaced by new loans.29
It is natural that we expect a very high overdue rate on that type of loan.
Therefore, the temporary halt in the increase of the overdue loan rate in the
first half of 2003 was the result of strategic behavior by credit card compa-
nies to disguise the seriousness of the problem. One can confirm from fig-
ure 5.14 that the overdue rate with replacement loans could be twice as
high as the overdue rate without them. Hence, we can conclude that the
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29. The Financial Supervisory Service changed the stance on the oﬃcial statistics only af-
ter they faced severe criticism against the practice in 2004.
overdue loan rate increased steadily at least until the end of 2003. Addi-
tionally, we also find in figure 5.15 that both profitability and quality of
loan portfolios showed a significant decline from the second half of 2002.
The pressure was building up in the credit card industry as the overdue
loans accumulated and the quality of loan portfolios deteriorated. The mo-
mentum that brought in the turbulent crisis in the credit card industry was
oﬀered by exogenous events outside the credit card market. The account-
ing fraud committed by SK Global Corporation was uncovered in March
2003, which sparked the spread of a pessimistic perspective across finan-
cial market.30 The growing concern about the strength of the financial
market hit the weakest spot at the time. The liquidity of the bonds issued
by credit card companies suddenly evaporated.
The most conspicuous symptom of liquidity evaporation is illustrated in
figure 5.16, which depicts the change in outstanding stock of money mar-
ket funds and short-term funds around the revelation of the accounting
fraud by SK Global in March 2003. Those funds carried portfolios focus-
ing on bonds issued by credit card companies. Investors rushed to secure
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30. The amount of accounting fraud committed by SK Global was 1.56 trillion Korean
Won. Virtually all imaginable kinds of accounting irregularities were utilized to camouflage
the deterioration of the balance sheet. Liability was undervalued, while asset was grossly over-
valued.
Fig. 5.14 Overdue rate of credit card loans
Source: Financial Supervisory Service.
Notes: Overdue rate I indicates the overdue loan rate excluding replacement loans. Overdue
rate II indicates the overdue loan rate including replacement loans.
Fig. 5.15 Net profit and quality of loan portfolios of credit card companies
Source: Financial Supervisory Service.
Note: Substandard loans indicate the proportion of loans classified as substandard or below.
Fig. 5.16 Outstanding stock of money market fund (MMF) and short-term 
bond fund
Source: Korea Association of Asset Management Corporations.
their investment on those funds, and fund managers were forced to dump
credit card bonds to meet the call for repurchasing from investors. Con-
fronted with a severe liquidity crisis, credit card companies were not able
to secure enough capital to meet the repayment requirement for the ma-
turing bonds they had issued.
Alarmed by the possibility of contagion of the crisis to other sectors in
the financial market, especially the banking sector, due to complex trans-
actions among financial institutions, the Korean government promptly in-
tervened and mediated debt rescheduling negotiations between credit card
companies and lending financial institutions to avert a catastrophic col-
lapse of the financial market. Credit card companies issued various debt in-
struments such as commercial paper, corporate bonds, and asset-backed
securities. The total debt of credit card companies was 17.6 trillion KRW
at the end of 2002. Investment trust companies that managed various kinds
of funds were the biggest lender, with an outstanding balance of 25.5 tril-
lion KRW. Banks followed at a close distance by lending 21.7 trillion KRW
to credit card companies. Insurance companies, security companies, and
pension funds also extended a significant amount credit to credit card
companies (see table 5.7).
Considering the size of debt held by banks and insurance companies that
are widely regarded to be related to system risk, some argue that the gov-
ernment intervention was well warranted.
Agreement between credit card companies and lending financial insti-
tutions was reached in April 2003. Credit card companies promised to
strengthen their financial structure by injecting more capital, and lending
financial institutions agreed to delay the redemption of matured bonds is-
sued by credit card companies. The financial market regained a sense of
stability, and credit card companies were able to secure liquidity by selling
newly issued bonds and structured securities that were backed by portfo-
lios of credit card loans.
However, the market had not retracted the doubt on the viability of
credit card companies and kept a watchful eye on the fulfillment of prom-
ised injection of additional capital to strengthen the financial structure.
The largest credit card company, LG Card, had become the main target in
the bond market. The overdue rate on LG Card’s loan portfolios stayed at
very high level, and the proportion of nonperforming loans rose very fast
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Table 5.7 Lenders of credit card companies by financial institution (trillion KRW)
Investment Insurance Security Pension
trust Banks company company fund Total
Amount 25.5 21.7 12.7 2.1 8.0 89.4
Note: The table illustrates the position at the end of 2003.
even after the agreement in April between credit card companies and fi-
nancial institutions that provided credit to them. Moreover, the fulfillment
of the capital expansion plan promised by the group of large shareholders
consisting of the family members controlling LG Group, then the third
largest conglomerate in Korea, was delayed. When the news that the group
of large shareholders had sold their shares in a discrete manner hit the mar-
ket, it suddenly became impossible to trade the bonds issued by LG Card,
and the company again faced severe diﬃculty in securing liquidity. The
company was overtaken by lending financial institutions led by the Korea
Development Bank, and a series of negotiations among creditors to devise
a plan to bail out the company came into fruit finally in December 2003.
5.4.2 Regulatory Failures
The first regulatory misstep was committed in 1999 when the ceiling on
the cash advance service was removed as a part of the deregulation and lib-
eralization of the financial market. It is very hard to question the legitimacy
of the deregulation measure in that setting the limit of the cash advance ser-
vice should be left to the private contract negotiated between credit card
company and customer. However, it is also true that in the absence of an ad-
equate credit evaluation system, the uniform ceiling on the maximum
amount of cash advance services played an important role in checking the
uncontrollable increase in cash advance services and keeping the soundness
of loan portfolios held by credit card companies. Before the deregulation
measure was taken, the cash advance service was limited to 700,000 KRW,
and that was not linked to creditworthiness of individual borrowers. Credit
card companies did not have either the will or the resources to be equipped
with a credit evaluation system. Free from harness, credit card companies
plunged into brutal competition to increase market shares. Along with the
removal of the ceiling on cash advance services, credit card companies
made a decision not to share credit information about customers’ available
credit amounts and card issuances that made unfettered increase in credit
card debt possible. As an inevitable result of the ill-advised deregulation
measure, credit card debt accumulated in an unprecedented pace in 2001
and 2002, and a fast increase in registered credit delinquents in 2003 fol-
lowed.
The second regulatory misstep was committed during the boom between
2000 and 2002. Despite increasing risks due to fast growing credit card
debts, the financial regulator did not fully understand the fundamental na-
ture of the problem. During the booming era, the credit card industry was
regarded as a highly profitable sector, and many financial institutions were
willing to provide credit to credit card companies by buying various debt
instruments issued by them. Table 5.8 reports the amount of credit fi-
nanced by various debt instruments. The outstanding stock of debt instru-
ments issued by credit card companies increased fivefold from 1999 to
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2002, and most of the debts were taken by banks and investment trust com-
panies in which banks had invested a significant portion of funds under
management as shown in table 5.7.
The high profitability of credit card companies that attracted huge
amount of credit into the sector was primarily based on the high interest
rate charged on overdue loans. Borrowers were able to pay the high inter-
est charged on overdue loans as long as they were allowed access to other
credit provisions. In other words, debtors already in arrears were able to
borrow from another credit card company to pay overdue loans. It looked
as if the high profitability of credit card companies would last forever.
However, that was the correct presumption only if borrowers could find an-
other credit card company to grant credit that would be used to pay the ex-
isting overdue loan. That, however, is a form of financial pyramid that can-
not be sustained and could be busted anytime.
Knowing the fragility of the scheme and observing the fast inflow of
huge credit into credit card companies, the financial regulator should have
intervened promptly. They should have blocked the inflow of credit by
tightening supervisory activities on banks and investment trust companies.
The financial regulator had the legitimate power to ask those financial in-
stitutions to stop providing further credit from the perspective of pruden-
tial regulation.
The third misstep was committed in 2002 when the financial regulator
took several measures to curb rapid credit expansion by credit card com-
panies. Giving up the laissez-faire attitude toward the credit card industry,
the financial regulator suddenly changed the policy stance and imposed
several very strong policy restrictions on them. The objective of the poli-
cies was to restore stability in the credit card market and to avoid realiza-
tion of system risk. More specifically, the proportion of cash advance ser-
vices out of total financial activities should be maintained under 50
percent, and prompt corrective action for failing credit card companies
was introduced. Most notably, the provision standard for bad debts was
strengthened. The new standard was even higher than the one required for
banks, and credit card companies suﬀered loss of confidence due to a de-
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Table 5.8 Financing by various debt instruments (billion KRW)
1999 2000 2001 2002
Commercial paper 4,084 9,649 11,324 20,888
Bonds 10,850 16,731 18,665 29,612
Asset backed security 4,476 26,712 33,535
Others 2,905 2,666 4,445 3,632
Total 17,839 33,264 61,146 87,666
teriorated position in income statements. The position in income state-
ments declined simply because credit card companies were required to set
aside more resources to meet the strengthened provision standard.
No one can raise a question to the necessity of the policy measures to re-
store stability of the market. But the timing and strength of regulatory in-
terventions invited strong criticism from both the market and the expert
commentators. Already in deep trouble in repaying monthly bills, a signifi-
cant portion of credit card debtors managed to avoid falling into arrears by
financing a new debt from other credit card companies or the usurious
private loan market. Sudden strengthening of regulatory measures and sub-
sequent tightening of credit risk management by credit card companies re-
sulted in a rapid increase in arrears and a decrease in credit card debts. Con-
sequently, the number of credit delinquents recorded at the public registry
soared by more than 50 percent in a year. Many observers claim that the reg-
ulatory authority could have been able to avoid such a violent crash landing
with a more cautious choice of timing and intensity of policy execution.
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Comment Winston T. H. Koh
The chapter examines the events surrounding the rapid expansion of
household debt in South Korea since the foreign exchange crisis that Ko-
rea suﬀered in 1997, which occurred as part of the Asian Financial Crisis.
A specific focus of the chapter is to investigate the developments in the
housing loan market and the credit card crisis in 2003, and the government
response to address the issues in both the housing loan market and the
credit card industry. The chapter argues that the crisis stems from regula-
tory failure, and with timely and proper regulatory actions, much of the
diﬃculties that occurred in the credit card market would have been allevi-
ated or averted.
I will make two general comments about the chapter, before going into
the specific comments. Firstly, in light of the intersecting sets of issues dis-
cussed in the chapter, it would be useful to provide, as a backdrop to the
analysis, a brief discussion of the state of the South Korean economy since
1997, in terms of rate of gross domestic product (GDP) growth, foreign in-
vestment inflow, current account deficit, and so on in order that the reader
can better appreciate the forces driving the economy and understand the
impetus for the business strategies of the banks and credit card companies
and the government’s responses. In particular, it would be useful to find out
if there were certain macroeconomic conditions that had prevented the au-
thorities from taking certain preventive or corrective actions to address the
developments in the credit markets.
Second, to the extent that data are available, it would be interesting to
analyze the data by age of household head as well as by income/assets to
gain a fuller picture. Table 5.1 and 5.2 look at household debt by age and
income/asset holdings, respectively. It would be interesting to analyze the
data by age of household head as well as by income/assets, if the data are
available.
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